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THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SCANDAL
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
George C. Landrith*
Congressional elections are affected by many
factors, such as incumbency, personal appeal,
issues, party affiliation and scandals. These are
not the only factors influencing Congressional
elections, but they are among the most important.
Possibly the least understood of these factors is
scandal.
Because very little is known or
published about how scandals affect Congressional
elections, I became interested in this topic.
Since scandals occur relatively seldom in
Congressional elections, they do not often play a
major role in the electoral outcome.
When
scandals
do
occur,
however,
and
become
publicized, they are bound to have some type of
effect on the election. Keeping this in mind, my
research question became, "What are the political
consequences
of
scandals
in
Congressional
elections?"
In order to answer this question, I had to
do original research since I found very little
published information.
First, I formulated a
1
questionnaire and a cover letter.
The cover
letter was used to generally explain and introduce
my
topic to the
respondents
while
the
questionnaire was used to gather information upon
*George is a senior majoring in Political
Science. He will be attending law school at the
University of Virginia this fall. George completed
an internship in the office of U.S. Representative
Frank R. Wolf CR-Virginia).
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which I could base my study. Second, I m::iiled
the cover letter ~nd questionnaire to about thirty
different people.
These people included opponents
of
former
Congressmen
involved
in
scandals, newspaper writers, political pollsters,
state party leaders , and the heads of n::itional
Congressional Election Committees. Third, I later
telephoned the people to whom I had written ,
hoping to interview them . After several \41eeks of
telephoning , I had interviewed only sixteen of the
thirty. Many of the respondents were either too
busy or were uncomfortable with the topic since it
was an election year and scandals are a touchy
subject at such times.
Through these sixteen interviews, however,
I was able to collect and compile some rather
interesting information.
In order to answer my
research question, "What are the political consequences of scandals in Congressional elections ?" I
had to break the topic down into the following
sub-questions.
1)

How do voters , campaign contributors,
and the media rank different scandals
in terms of seriousness?

2)

Do certain regional areas view any type
of scandal either more or less seriously
than the nation as a whole?

3)

How does the timing of a scandal, in
relation to election day, affect the
media, the voters , and the campaign
contributors?

4)

What makes a scandal so serious?

5)

How do candidates, party organizations,
Congress, the media, and opponents
deal with scandals?
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Is there an increase in media attention
to scandals? If so, why?

These sub-questions are taken from the questionnaire that I used in my research.
I will deal
with each sub-question separately. After answering each individual question, I will then correlate
the sub-questions through a conclusion.
Seriousness of Different Scandals
Voters
In an effort to discover which scandals were
of the most concern to voters, I asked the
respondents, "How would you rank the following
scandals in terms of importance to voters using a
zero-to-ten
scale
( 0 = not
at
all
serious,
10 = very serious)?" I then listed six categories
of scandals:
heterosexual promiscuity, graft,
homosexuality, misuse of funds, drugs, 1rnd
other. On the average, misuse of funds was the
most serious scandal with an average rating of
8. 2.
Graft and homosexuality were second and
third with a rating of 7. 6 and 7. 4 respectively.
Drugs and heterosexual promiscuity were the least
serious scandals scoring 7. 2 and 5. 2 respectively.
No one ever responded to "other," even though I
specifically mentioned it.
Graph 1 depicts this
information well.
There was a general consensus among the
responde-n ts concerning misuse of funds, graft,
and drugs.
Most of the respondents ranked
these scandals very similarly to the average
ranking. In other words, few respondents gave
rankings that differed significantly from · the
average. The reason for this general consensus
on the misuse of funds, graft, and drugs is that
they are perceived almost universally by voters
as affecting R Congressman's or SenRtor's ability
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Graph 1: Voters' Ranking- of Scandals
(in terms of seriousness)
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to perform as a legislator.
For voters, these
types of scandals are very difficult to rationalize
by saying, "Well, it's just his personal life
style . " The fact is that in our society bribes
and misuse of funds are not usually considered
"personal life styles ."
In comparison , however, homosexuality and
heterosexual promiscuity lacked a consensus.
Some respondents ranked them as eights, nines,
or tens. Others ranked them as zeros, ones, or
twos, and still others ranked them somewhere in
between zero and ten .
The reason for this
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diversity of opinion can be easily explained.
Some
voters
feel
th flt
homosexuality
or
heterosexual promiscuity are personal matters :rnd
do not affect a Congressman's or Senator's performance as a legislator any more than the brand
of facial tissue he uses would. However, other
voters feel that it is unacceptable for a legislator
to be involved in such things because it shows a
lack of moral character which they feel is needed
by our lawmakers. As a result of these widely
divergent viewpoints, the av~rage rankings given
to homosexuality and heterosexual promiscuity
were very different from the individual responses, since the individual responses tended to
be polarized toward either a ranking of ten or
zero.
Campaign Contributors
When the respondents were asked to rank
the importance of different scandals to campaign
contributors,
the result
changed somewhat.
Misuse of funds was still the most significant
scandal, scoring 6. 9.
Graft and homosexuality
tied for the second most significant scandal, each
scoring 6. 5. Drugs followed close behind with a
score of 6. 4.
Lastly, heterosexual promiscuity
was the least significant scandal, averaging only
3. 5. These facts are illustrated most clearly in
Graph 2 .
Once ::igain, there was a basic consensus on
misuse of funds, graft, and drugs. Surprisingly, ther-e was more agreement on the importance
of homosexuality among campaign contributors
than among voters.
While there was still some
disparity on the importance of homosexuality, the
disparity was less polarized than with voters . In
other words, the individual responses were much
closer to the average with the campaign contributors than with the voters.
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Graph 2: Campaign Contributors'
Ranking- of Scandals
(in terms -of seriousness)
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It is interesting to note that campaign contributors
viewed
all
the
scandals
except
heterosexual promiscuity as relatively similar in
their level of seriousness.
Over half of the
respondents agreed on an explanation of this
phenomenon.
First, the campaign contributor
tends to view his or her contribution to a candidate as a "bet" or an "investment ." As a result,
any scandfll that may damage or lessen a candidate's chances for election will likely influence the
contributor's decision on whether or not to support the candidate. Since voters ranked misuse
of funds, graft, homosexuality, and drugs as
relatively serious scandals but did not view
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heterosexual promiscuity as a very serious scandal, it seems logical th flt campaign contributors
with an "investment" or "bet" in mind, view
misuse of funds, graft, homosexuality and drugs
as relatively serious scandals, while they view
heterosexual promiscuity as much less serious.
Media
When the respondents were asked to rank
the several scandals according to the media's view
of seriousness, the results changed once again.
First of all, the three most significant scandals
were misuse of funds, scoring 9. 4, with graft and
drugs closely behind at 9 .1 each.
Following
somewhat more distantly were homosexuality and
heterosexual promiscuity averaging 7. 9 and 7. 6
respectively. Graph 3 illustrates the findings.
A prominent political editor for a large
newspaper said that the media views misuse of
funds, graft, and drugs as similar in relative
seriousness or importance. He stated that these
sorts of scandals are widely believed to affect a
legislator's performance in office and are, therefore,
extremely relevant
news items.
The
scandals involving heterosexual promiscuity or
homosexuality are not as clearly linked to performance in office and, therefore, do not usually get
quite as much attention. The editor did go on to
say, however, that all scandals are relevant to
the media. As a result, all scandals will receive
some media coverage. The difference is that very
serious ·scandals involving the misuse of funds,
graft, and drugs are given more attention and
are treated more negatively than less serious
scandals
like
homosexuality
or
heterosexual
promiscuity.
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Graph 3: Media's Rnnkings of Scandals
(in terms of seriousness)
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Comparison of Voter, Campaign Contributor, and
Media
When comparing the importance of scandals
to voters with their importance to campaign
contributors and the media, two points become
obvious:
1) campaign
contributors
view
all
scandals as substantially less important than both
voters and the media, and 2) the media views
scandals as substantially more important than both
voters and campaign contributors.
The first
point is demonstrated by the fact that campaign
contributors ranked misuse of funds at 6. 9 while
the voters' ranking was 8. 2 and the media ranked
it 9. 4.
Likewise, drugs, homosexuality, and
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heterosexual promiscuity were all ranked as less
important to campaign contributors than to either
voters or the media.
The second point is
demonstrated by the media's ranking g-raft at 9 .1
while voters and campaign contributors ranked it
only 7. 6 and 6. 5 respectively.
Likewise, the
media ranked drugs as 9 .1, but voters felt it was
only 7. 6 and campaign contributors felt it only
merited a 6. 5. Heterosexual promiscuity, misuse
of funds, and homosexuality followed this same
trend.
These two points are illustrated clearly
by Graph 4.
Graph 4: A Comparison of Voters', Campaig-n
Contributors', and the Media's Ranking of Scandals
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As shown in Graph 4, campaign contributors
consistently viewed all the scandals as less
serious than did either voters or the media.
When I asked the respondents why campaign
contributors consider scandals less serious than
do voters or the media, the most frequent answer
was that the campaign contributors view the
candidates and elections as "investments" or
"bets" and as a result, the scandal itself is not
terribly important. What is important is whether
or not a scandal makes a candidate a "poor investment" or a "bad risk." If the scandal makes
the candidate a "poor investment" or a "bad
risk," then the campaign contributor would feel
that the scandal is serious.
However, if the
scandal does not appear to damage the candidate's
chance of victory in the election, then to the
campaign contributor, the scandal is not of great
importance.
A somewhat less skeptical respondent explained that campaign contributors are issue
voters and thus they base their support or
nonsupport of a candidate upon the issues and
not his personal characteristics. Several of the
respondents who offered this explanation felt that
campaign contributors were more politically astute
or aware.
This political awareness allows the
campaign contributors to react less emotionally to
a scandal than the average voter would.
As
Graph 4 clearly shows,
the media
considers all of the scandals more serious than
either the voters or the campaign contributors.
From my research, I was able to derive two
explanations for this: 1) the media sees itself as
a "watchdog" of government and fulfilling this
role of "watchdog" requires the media to view
scandals very seriously, and 2) scandals are
interesting news; thus, scandals sell newspapers.
I will briefly touch upon these two explanations.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

117

First of fill, the "watchdog" role of the media
means that the media exposes or gives attention
to scandHls because the media feels that it has a
responsibility to present the facts to the public.
One point that I want to make clear is that the
personal opinions of the members of the media
about scandals did not seem to differ significantly
from those of any of the other groups of people I
interviewed.
However,
because
of
their
professional responsibility to be "watchdogs," the
members of the media feel an obligation or duty to
present the facts about the scandals even if they
personally think it is trivial.
Thus, the media
ranks almost all scandals as relatively serious
because it feels that the public has the right to
decide what is trivial and what is important. I
think
that
this
"watchdog"
explanation
is
reasonable; however, it is only part of the
answer.
The second explanation states that scandals
sell papers or improve ratings; therefore, the
media focuses in on scandals. This view is more
cynical, but it has some truth to it. · It has been
said that when a dog bites a m:rn, it is not news,
but when a man bites a dog, it is news. This
saying is analogous to scandals and the news.
For example, there are thousands of homosexuals
in the United States; yet, in recent months,
Representative
Studds
CD-Massachusetts)
has
received a lot of attention in the press while few
other homosexuals are ever featured in the
headlines.
In short, when elected officials are
involved· in "questionable" activities or scandals,
the public is interested and people buy the paper
and watch the news that tells all of the details of
the
scandal.
Once
again ,
however,
this
explanation is only partly useful because other
factors mHy be involved.
Another very important factor will be
covered in a later section of this paper entitled
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"Greater Media Attention." In this section I will
give a third explanation of why the media ranks
all scandals more seriously than voters or
campaign contributors.
Regional Differences
In order to determine if the serious_ness of
scandals varied throughout the United States by
region, I asked, "Are there some parts of the
country that may consider one or more of these
scandals either less or more serious than the
nation as a whole?" Every respondent felt that
there was a great deal of variance within the
country.
First of all, it was generally believed that all
five scandals (misuse of funds, graft , homosexuality , drugs, and heterosexual promiscuity)
are viewed as more serious in three major areas:
1) rural areas such as the Midwest, 2) the South,
and 3) highly religious areas such as the Bible
Belt and Utah.
I realize that these three categories can be overlapped. For example, much of
the South is rural and much of the South is
considered a part of the Bible Belt. However ,
even though these three categories overlap , they
are not necessarily redundant.
For example,
Richmond, Virginia, or Atlanta, Georgia, are
Southern, nonrural cities, but they were believed
by the respondents to view all of the scandals as
more serious than most cities in the Northeast. I
will offer explanations as to why these three
areas might consider the scandals more serious
than the nation as a whole.
First, rural areas, such as the Midwest or
parts of the South, might consider scandals to be
more serious than the - nation as a whole because
rural areas tend to be more homogeneous.
By
definition, a homogeneous society's population is
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relatively uniform or similar in its characteristics.
This means the people ::ire educated similarly,
hold similar opinions, have similar social and
economic backgrounds, etc. This lack of diversity in a homog-eneous society can lead to intolerance toward people and toward ideas that are
different or unfamiliar. As a result of this lack
of tolerance, scandals can be viewed very seriously in a homogeneous society.
Parts of the
Midwest and the South could be considered relatively homogeneous, thus accounting partially for
scandals being- seen as serious in these areas.
Second, the South might consider these
scandals more serious because it tends to be a
more traditional society. The rules produced by
a traditional society are rules that have been
passed from generation to generation and continued for so long that they almost carry the
force of law. Since the rules have been in force
for a Ione: period of time, they are likely to be
morally conservative rules or rules that may be
considered "old fashioned" in today's society.
When these rules are broken the offense is not
taken lightly or quickly forgotten. In contrast, a
more modern society (or at least a nontraditional
one) seems to have fewer and less strict rules for
members of society.
Since a traditional society
has more strict rules than a modern society, it is
not too difficult to understand why an area such
as the South--which tends to be traditional--may
view scandals more seriously.
Thfrd, the highly religious areas like Utah
may view the scandals more seriously because
scandals violate moral codes that are considered
important in almost all religions.
For example,
heterosexual promiscuity would be very serious in
Utah, as former Congressman Howe CD-Utah),
who attempted to solicit two prostitutes on the
day after he had won the Democratic primary,
could attest. Conversely, the same scandal may
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not be very serious at all in New York City
where it may not be an unusual happening and
where those who practice religion are not as
highly concentrated.
In short, a scandal in a
highly religious area would be interpreted by
voters as a sign of moral weakness and
compromising standards , which is not usually
tolerable to the very religious. Another factor to
be considered in religious areas is that they tend
to be more traditional and more homogeneous than
areas which are not noted as "religious regions."
On the other hand, various scandals were
perceived to be less serious in large cities and
Northeast. Scandals such as graft or misuse of
funds are less serious in large unionized cities
like Chicago or Pittsburg. In New York, Boston,
and San Francisco, homosexuality is less serious.
Likewise, drugs are less serious in New York and
California .
Finally , heterosexual promiscuity is
less serious in almost all large cities, in the
Northeast, and in California.
These scandals are considered to be less
serious in the large cities and the Northeast
because they are more common there. For example, in a unionized town with big business, graft
is perceived to be more common and therefore it
is
less
shocking
or
serious.
Likewise,
homosexuality is more common in New York and
San Francisco than in other areas; thus, it is not
viewed as seriously.
In short , when a scandal
occurs more frequently , its impact and seriousness are lessened.
Another factor is that the
Northeast, large cities, and California are very
heterogeneous.
Diversity is extreme in these
areas . The people in these areas are willing to
accept differences, including scandal. This does
not mean that they are amoral. It simply means
that they are more tolerant of politicians who are
involved in scandals.
In short, heterogeneity
encourages more tolerance, thus explaining why
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sc~rndals are viewed less seriously or more tolerantly in
the
Northeast,
large cities,
and
California.

Timing of Scandal
My next goal was to determine if the timing
of a scandal in relation to the election affects its
importance to the following groups of people:
1) voters, 2) campaign contributors, 3) opponents
of the scandalous candidates, and 4) the media.
While the timing of a scandal impacts all four of
these groups, the timing has various effects on
each of them.
Voters
The closer a scandal is to the election, the
more seriously it is viewed by the voters.
In
other words, a scandal that occurs a few weeks
before the election is more damaging to a candidate than a scandal that occurs many months
before the election. When a scandal occurs right
before an election, it is difficult for the candidate
to rebound from it. There is little time for the
"scandalous" candidate to establish his innocence
or to redeem his character. Likewise, a scandal
that happens close to an election gets more coverage (mostly negative) than one that occurs a year
or two before elections.
A second reason scandals that occur close to
elections· are considered more serious by voters is
the short memory of voters. One leader of the
Democratic party said that voters, on the whole,
have a limited ability to remember scandals after
six months. He referred to this as a "six-month
window." There was a general consensus among
the respondents that the voters tend to forget or
maybe even forgive after enough time has passed.
As R result, if a scandal must hit, the best time
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would be the December or January right after the
election.
This would give Congressmen and
Senators about two to six years r-e spectively to
prove that they are capable legislators despite the
scandal, or give the voters enough time to forget.
Campaign Contributors
The campaign contributors are less affected
by the timing of a scandal but they are affected
nonetheless. If the scandal occurs close to the
election, the candidate already has the contributor's money; thus, in one sense, a scandal late in
a candidate's campaign theoretically should not
drastically hurt his fund raising.
However, it
could hurt support for subsequent reelection
efforts, so a scandal should never be taken
lightly. Perhaps more important, however, is the
fact that the campaign contributors ranked all
five
scandals,
from
misuse
of
funds
to
heterosexual promiscuity, as less serious than the
voters and the media ranked them. This would
seem to indicate that a scandal may not affect a
campaign contributor's support nearly as much as
it would erode voter support.
As explained
earlier, campaign contributors look at their con tributions as "investments . " Secondly, campaign
contributors could be more issue conscious and
less interested in scandals. For these reasons,
campaign contributors are the least affected by
the timing of a scandal.
Opponents
One man's loss is another man's gain. For
this reason, the political opponent of a scandalous
candidate is bound to benefit from his opponent's
scandal.
The more serious the scandal or the
closer it occurs to election day, the better it is
for the opponent. A scandal that occurs a year
or more before elections may have only a small
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benefit for the opponent. The longer time period
allows voters to either forgive or forget while
allowing the candidate to prove his capabilities as
a legislator.
Media
The media's reaction to the timing of a
scandal surfaces almost exclusively in the amount
of attention given to it. For example, a scandal
that occurs two weeks before an election will be a
big news item until after the election .
This
means that the scandal will be front-page news
for over two weeks. However, if the same scandal occurred over a year before the election, it
would die down after a few days. Even if the
scandal remained a news item for a couple of
weeks, it would not be the "top story." this
means that a scandal occurring long before
election time will not be in the news as long, nor
will it get the top billing as long nor be treated
as negatively as a scandal occurring near an
election.
In short, an election-time scandal is
played up and given special attention by the
media, whereas the nonelection-time scandal gets
relatively little exposure.
Seriousness of the Act
My next goal was to find out what aspect of
a scandal makes it so serious.
I particularly
wanted to know if voters and cR.mpaign contributors differed in what made a scandalous act
serious.
There was no particular answer that
was given most frequently by either voters or
campaign contributors.
When the informR.tion
gathered from this question is examined in conjunction with the other information that I obtained
from my questionnaire, I feel that I can offer
some good explanations to answer the question:
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What makes a "scandalous" act so serious to the
voters and campaign contributors?
Voters
All of my interviews indicated to some extent
that there are so many different factors that
could explain why a scandalous act is serious that
it would be difficult to pinpoint one specific item .
Nevertheless, one theme seemed to be basic to all
of the responses. What makes scandals so serious
to voters is that they feel as though their trust
was betrayed.
As a political editor for a
newspaper in Virginia explained, voters elect a
representative that they think they can trust.
Many times a scandal serves to tell voters, "See ,
you cannot trust him." The reason voters feel
that their trust has been betrayed is that a
candidate usually tries to create an image of
honesty, integrity, and competence.
But when
voters see scandals, they begin to question the
candidate's image of honesty and integrity .
Voters feel as though their trust was taken
advantage of by the "scandalous" candidate.
In other cases, scandals cause voters to feel
that candidates have grossly misrepresen t ed
themselves.
For example , if a candidate cam paigns on values such as family, preservation of
the morals of society, etc. , t he voters expect the
candidate to live a life that is in keeping with his
campaign ideals. If a candidate is involved in a
scandal
like
heterosexual
promiscuity
or
homosexuality, the voters feel the candidate is a
hypocrite and that he grossly misr epresented
himself.
The scandal involving Representative
Robert Bauman CR-Maryland) illustrates this point
vividly. He presented himself as a strong conservative against homosexuality and all other
"vices of our liberal society."
Then he was
caught involved in a homosexual act on Capitol
Hill.
This made him look hypocritical and
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Because he g-rossly misrepresented his
he lost the support of his constitu-

Another factor that helps explain what makes
a scandnl so serious was given by Patrick Shea
when he said th~t a scandal "rips at the moral
fiber" of society.
The voters many times feel as
though their values are being attacked by the
scandal.
This attitude makes voters defensive
:rnd feel as though they must protect the "moral
fiber" of society by voting out the candidate
involved in the scandal.
The feelings of betrayed trust, hypocrisy,
gross misrepresentation of character, and the
"ripping of the moral fiber" of society were all
central themes in explaining what makes a scandal
so serious to voters.
Campaign Contributors
The campaign contributors vary only slightly
from the voters in this aspect.
As I already
explained, campaign contributors do not view
scandals as seriously as voters. However, to the
degree that campaign contributors do view
scandals as serious, one may say that the abovementioned betrayed trust,
hypocrisy,
gross
misrepresentation of character, and the "ripping
of the moral fiber" of society are all important
factors.
However, for campaign contributors another
important factor in explaining what makes a
scandal so serious stems again from the idea that
a contribution is viewed as an "investment." for
campaign contributors, a scandalous act becomes
more serious when it hurts the candidate's chance
for reelection.
In other words, if the voters
seem to be outraged by the scandal then campaign
contributors also worry more about it because
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their "investment" may not work out.
On the
other hand, when voters seem to be relatively
unaffected by a sc:rndal, then the contributors
feel like their investment is safe; thus, the
contributor is less troubled by the scandal.
Jail Sentence
The second part of this question asked if a
jail sentence made a scandal even more damaging.
The universal answer was "yes."
Richard
Ciccone described a jail sentence as "the kiss of
4
death."
The main reason the jail sentence is so
serious is that the accusation of scandal is no
longer alleged-- it's final.
A conviction and jail
sentence leaves no room for doubt of guilt in the
minds of the voters .
In addition, the media
coverage of a jail sentence is not likely to boost
any candidate's career.
How Groups Deal with Scandal
Candidate
When talking with respondents, I found that
candidates can react to accusations of scandals in
two ways : 1) they can deny any guilt or in volvement, or 2) they can ::idmit involvement or
guilt.
There are many variables that dictate
which Rpproach would be most advantageous to
the candidate. Some of these include the type of
scandal, the candidate's district , the candidate's
popularity , the candidate's representation of his
district , etc.
I was told by one man on Capitol Hill that if
a candidate has deniability, he should deny a
scandal (deniability means that the candidate was
not caught "red-handed" and that there is some
doubt as to his guilt) .
The Capitol Hill aide
reasoned that strong supporters would believe the
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accused candidate was innocent if he claimed to
be innocent.
For example, many Americans
refused to believe Richard Nixon had anything to
do with the Watergate cover-up because he
claimed innocence.
(However, after Nixon had
lost his "deniabili ty," few believed his claim to
innocence.)
Therefore, if the candidate has
"deniability," he should deny involvement in the
scandal.
By denying it, the candidate may
convince many voters that he is innocent.
However, when 11 deniability 11 does not exist
and the question of guilt or involvement is not
very debatable, most respondents agreed that
admitting guilt was the best tactic. By admitting
guilt and expressing regret, a candidate can
quiet the media and the opposition quickly. For
example, if a Congressman admits guilt and
expresses sorrow, the scandal will be in the
headlines only briefly and will be looked upon
more tolerably. But if the Congressman denies
guilt when it seems obvious that he is guilty, the
media will keep the story in the headlines for a
much greater length of time, and will treat the
scandal more negatively.
Admitting guilt is particularly effective when
the scandal is a personal problem such as
heterosexual promiscuity or alcoholism.
By
admitting it and expressing sorrow, the voters
feel the candidate had a problem or made a mistake , but should be forgiven.
Likewise, the
media and the opposition cannot play up the
scandal ·after admission of guilt and expression of
remorse because they do not want to appear cruel
or as if they are trying to capitalize on the
scandal. Therefore, admitting guilt and expressing remorse is a good way to quiet the opposition
and the media. A good example of this is Representative Daniel Crane CR-Illinois). He admitted and expressed sorrow for his 11 affair," and he
recently won renomination within his party.
I
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was told by several people in the media covering
Capitol Hill that Crane is no longer receiving
"bad press." As far as the media is concerned,
the situation has basically blown over.
Party Organization
The party organization's main gmil is to win
elections.
The same thing is true of a party
organization whose candidate was involved in a
scandal. If the party thinks that their candidate
who was involved in a scandal will lose, and if
the party thinks it can find another candidate
who has a better chance to win, the party organization will likely support the new candidate
hoping he will win. Furthermore, as Patrick Shea
pointed out, when the scandal is hurting the
party, the party will try to isolate the scandal
and its complications from the party in order to
protect itself from the scandalous image .
Nevertheless, if the local party organization
cannot field a better candidate, it will stick with
the current one even if he is accused of scandal.
While there may be some dissent, chances are that
most of the party will support the accused candidate if there is no better choice . If the candidate has been a good representative of his district's interests and is seen by the local party
organization as having "brought home the bacon , "
the accused candidate will likely receive support
from the local party despite his "scandalous"
image.
Congress
The Congress as a whole has two theories
about how to deal with scandals: 1) disassociate
Congress with the scandal by taking punitive
action, or 2) ignore the scandal, thus showing
the ability to deal with scandal. Generally, the
first method of taking punitive action is used for
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the more serious scandals.
Conversely, the
ignoring method is used for the more "trivial" or
personal scandals like alcoholism and heterosexual
promiscuity.
There is an underlying- theme to both the
punitive and ignoring methods:
the institution
comes first, the individual second.
In other
words, the Congress feels a need to protect
itself, or more accurately its image, from the
effects of scandals.
This means that Congress'
reaction to a scandal is larg-ely determined by
what action Congress feels it must take to protect
itself.
When the scandal deals with alcoholism or
heterosexual promiscuity and the member of
Congress has Admitted and expressed remorse for
it, Congress will not be likely to do anything. If
Congress were to take action, it would appear too
rigid, heavy-handed, and old fashioned. This is
an image that, by and large, Congress does not
want.
On the other hand, when the scandal is very
serious, as with the misuse of funds, Congress is
more likely to take punitive action.
Congress
wants to let the public know that it does not
condone such "dishonesty and corruption in
government." If Congress does nothing about a
highly publicized, serious scandal, it runs the
risk of looking too lax and insensitive to the need
of good, honest government. A lax and insensitive image is one that Congress does not want.
The party leadership in Congress protects
the party first and the candidate second.
For
example, when the leadership of a party feels
that its candidate has little chance for victory
because of a scandal, the leadership will ask him
to resign or not to run for office. The leadership's main concern is holding on to that seat in
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Congress. Their secondary concern is with the
candidate himself. In short, the parties are most
concerned with retaining power.
It is difficult to describe exactly how Congress deals with scandal because Congress is
really a collection of 535 very different and
independent people. As a result, it is difficult to
give hard and fast rules that are used on Capitol
Hill.
This is especially true when dealfog with
scandals because of the many factors that make
scandals either serious or not serious . In short,
the information that I have provided about how
Congress deals with scandal is by necessity
relatively general. But it is accurate to say that
as Congress protects itself first,
and the
individual second, likewise, parties protect their
power first, and the individual's second.

Media
The media has a definite interest in publicizing a scandal and making it a headline. First of
all, scandals sell papers.
Secondly, the press
feels the need to be a "watchdog" over the government.
While the media will tend to print almost all
"scandalous" events, it does have the freedom or
discretion to print or not print a story.
The
media does not withhold scandals from the public
because there is no real motivation to do so. The
media stands to lose nothing by publicizing
scandals and stRnds to gain notoriety and influence by publishing them ; thus , the media almost
always publicizes scandals .
Opponents of "Scandalous" Candidates
The opponents of the candidate accused of
scandal would like nothing better than media
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coverage of the scandal, so the opponent must be
tactful in his effort to see a scandal work to his
::i.dvantage.
For example, if one candidate is
::iccused of graft, his opponent would not be wise
to constantly call him a crook or dishonest. A
much more effective method would be subtlety.
Playing up the theme of honesty ::i.nd integrity
would be effective because the candidate would
never actually mention the scandal but listeners
would almost automatically think of the dishonesty
of the other candidate.
This subtle method of bringing a scandal to
the voters' minds is A very effective way to make
political gain out of a scandal. For example, if
the opponent were to constantly announce in
public the scandalous candidate's promiscuous
behavior, many voters would feel like the opponent was picking on the "scandalous" candidate.
If the voters feel like the opponent is picking on
the other candidate, they will think the opponent
is petty. When this happens, the scandal backfires and actually hurts the innocent candidate
and helps the "scandalous" candidate.
The
danger of looking petty when playing up a
scandal is particularly acute when the scandals
are more personal in nature, such as alcoholism,
heterosexual promiscuity, and, in some areas,
homosexuality. To avoid looking petty, but still
play up the scandal, the opponent should portray
himself as a good, honest family man, being seen
with his wife and children frequently.
This
would subtly remind voters that he is a man that
would never by involved in such scandals. At
the same time, he avoids the blacklash effect that
can be caused by picking on the other candidate.
More Media Attention
When I asked if there hHd been e;reater
media attention to scandals in the past ten years,
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I received a few nos, but the large majority said,
"yes" ( 13 out of 15 said media attention to
scandals had increased).
The few respondents
who answered "no" felt like the media attention to
scandals had remained about constant during the
past ten years.
However, the majority felt that media attention had increased. When asked why th_e media
had increased its coverage of scandals, most
respondents said, "Watergate." Other less fre quently named reasons were 1) new campaign
disclosure laws, and 2) the Vietnam War.
Watergate has made the public irnd the media
more skeptical of our government and our leaders .
Likewise, the rags-to-riches story, or at
least the fame of Woodward and Bernstein, made
investigative
reporting
more
popular .
Mr.
Ciccone, the political editor of the Chicago
Tribune, ssiid that "everybody wants to be a
Woodstein."
This may account for the added
attention that scandals receive in the media.
The more strict campaign disclosure laws
show the distrust that Watergate generated among
the public. Furthermore , they make it easier to
find a possible scandal. Therefore, scandals are
easier to expose now than they were before
Watergate.
Vietnam was cited because it showed the
American public the terrible things the government would do for the sake of saving face . (In
the late sixties the goals of the war changed
drastically until the primary objective had become
saving America from embarrassment rather than
attaining freedom for the Vietnamese.)
As a
result, the Vietnam War bred distrust and contempt for the government.
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Several newspaper writers said that in the
past, the personal lives of politicians were not
publicized.
They pointed to the fact that
Franklin D. Roosevelt was not shown in a wheelchair hy the media while in office. While being in
a wheelchair is hRrdly scandalous, it shows that
personal things were not publicized. It was told
by several respondents that the media, by and
large, was well aware of John F. Kennedy's
affairs and yet they did not make an issue of it
because it was a personal matter. Whether or not
these stories of scandal about Kennedy are true
is not important.
They serve to illustrate that
even though the press thought the scandalous
stories were true, they did not print them.
Today personal things are publicized almost
indiscriminately.
For example, Representatives
Crane and Howe saw that "personal" scandals
were publicized. This shows a basic change in
the attitude of the media toward personal
scandals.
An interesting paradox arises when we
consider the fact that in the past, people were
probably less tolerant of all types of scandals,
yet the press only publicized the scandals that
dealt directly with performance.
Today, when
the public is generally more tolerant of scandals
(at least ones like heterosexw:1l promiscuity,
homosexuality, and alcoholism), the press will
publicize any scandal, even a fairly trivial one
like former Senator Birch Bayh's (D-Indfana)
mishap with the franking privilege.
This new
treatment of scandals by the media creates a
paradox in that years ago, in a more "conservative society," the press wR.s more tolerant of
scandals while today, in a society that is more
open and uninhibited, the press is rather "intolerant" of scandals.
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Conclusion

In my conclusion, I will try to bring together the main points which this study has led me to
discover. Everything I learned seemed to center
around the idea that there are so many different
variables involved in scandals that it is difficult
to predict their exact effect. One could say that
scandals are like snowflakes--no two are _exactly
alike.
Some scandals can actually help a candidate.
For example, several of the respondents told me
that
Representative
Gerry
Studds
CD-Massachusetts)
has
benefited
from
his
homosexuality scandal. His constituency is very
liberal and are not bothered by homosexuality.
But more importantly, it gave Gerry Studds the
image of being his own man, not just following
along.
That image is believed to have helped
Representative Studd's popularity.
In another
example, George Hansen of Idaho has been involved in tax scandals more than once, but
several respondents claimed that it was helping
Hansen.
He has written a book about how the
"Eastern bureaucracy and liberals" are trying to
damage his professional reputation.
This has
given him the image of a hero fighting an almost
unbeatable "monster" represented by the govern ment and the Internal Revenue Service.
On the other hand, scandals can be and
usually are damaging. Too many candidates have
lost elections as a result of a scandal to say that
scandals do not hurt a candidate.
Take for
example Bauman of Maryland; when his scandal
became publicized, reelection was out of the
question. Perhaps the only question was whether
he could avoid spending time behind bars.
Likewise with Hinson of Mississippi and Howe of
Utah; scandals were "the beginning of the end"
of their political careers.
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While scandals as a general rule are dami:iging to election goals, they can in some circumstances actually help or have a neutral effect.
There Are so many variables involved in what
effect a scandal will have that truly accurate
information is difficult to accumulate. Therefore,
while my findings could not be used to predict
the political consequences of every scandal, they
are useful as a general guide in understanding
the consequences of scandals. These effects can
best be summarized by pointing out the following.
1)

Voters ranked misuse of funds, graft,
drug abuse,
and homosexuality as
relatively serious while heterosexual
promiscuity is perceived as less serious.

2)

Campaign
contributors
ranked
all
scandals as substantially less important
than voters or the media.

3)

The media ranked all scandals as substantially more important than voters or
campaign contributors.

4)

When ranking- scandals, regional differences become apparent.
The South,
the Midwest, rural areas, and highly
religious areas viewed scandals more
seriously.
On the other hand, the
Northeast, large urban areas,
and
California viewed scandals, especially
personal scandals, less seriously.

5)

The timing of a scandal does affect
voters because they have a tendency to
forget or forgive.
Thus, a scandal
right before an election is more serious.
Likewise, a scandal rig-ht before an
election gets more media attention and
more negative attention.

136

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW
6)

The breach of trust and hypocrisy make
scandals serious to voters.
Also, the
negative reaction of voters to scandals
makes scandals serious to campaign
contributors.

7)

Candidates can either deny guilt or
admit guilt and express remorse for it.
By admitting- guilt and expressing
remorse, a candidate can quiet the
opposition and the media.

8)

District party organizations' main concern is winning the election, so that
goal largely determines how the district
deals with a scandal.

9)

The Congress's main concern is protecting the institution.
Likewise,
the
Republican and Democratic parties' main
concern is maintaining or increasing
their power. Thus, a candidate who is
likely to lose as a result of a scandal
will be encouraged to withdraw.

10)

The media has given more attention to
scandals because of Watergate, which
created a general distrust of government and politicians .
Watergate also
increased the number of investigative
reporters.

These ten points, when considered together,
provide an answer to the question, "What are the
political consequences of scandal in Congressional
elections?" If the answer to this question seems
to be complex and influenced by many factors,
then I have accurately presented the findings of
my research. It may be interesting to see how
well these ten points explain the political consequences of scandals in the upcoming Congressional elections .
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APPENDIX
Item #1:

Cover Letter
Date

Dear
I am presently taking a course from Dr.
David Magleby on Congress at Brigham Young
University in Provo, Utah. For my term paper in
this class, I would like to analyze the political
consequences of "scandal" in Congressional Campaigns. As you know, there has been a seeming
1ncrease in scandals, such as: graft (Abscam),
homosexuality,
heterosexual promiscuity,
etc.
Despite the importance of this topic, I can find
no published scholarly information that will help
me in studying the effects of scandals in Congressional elections.
As a
(position)
, you have seen the
consequences of scandals and know how they have
been dealt with. Your knowledge would help me
greatly in my research.
I realize your time is
limited and valuable.
Keeping this in mind, I
would like to telephone you in about a week to
hold a brief ( 10-12 minute) phone interview. I
h ave enclosed the questionnaire that I will use
during our interview, so that you will be familiar
with my research topic.
I appreciate your time and expertise in
helping me with this research project.
If you
would like, I would be happy to send you the
results of my research upon its completion. Once
again, thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
George C. Landrith
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Item #2:

1.

Questionnaire

How would you rank the following scandals
in terms of importance to voters, Campaign
Contributors, and the media?
(Ranking:
0 = Not at all serious, 10 = Very serious.)
Heterosexual
Promiscuity

Graft
(Abscam)

Homosexuality

Voters
Campaign
Contributors
Media
Misuse
of
Funds
Voters
Campaign
Contributors
Media

Drugs

Other
(Specify)
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Are there some parts of the country that
may
con sider
one
or
more
of these
"scandals," either less or more serious than
the nation on the whole?
Heterosexual Promiscuity
Graft (Abscam)
Homosexuality
Misuse of Funds
Drugs
Other (specify)
Why?
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3.

Does the timing of a scandal effect its
importance and/or affect the media?
(Ex:
right before election or 1-1/2 years before
election for a Congressman and 4-5 years for
a Senator?)
a.

to the voters ?

b.

to campai gn contributors?

c.

to "scandalous candidates"' opponents?
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R..

What makes the "scandalous" act so
serious to the voters and campaign
contributors?
The act
itself?

The
circumstances?

Voters
Campaign
Contributors
The other
p::1rty involved

Other?
(specify)

Voters
Campaii.sn
Contributors
b.

Does a jail sentence make the "scandal"
even more damaging? Why?
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5.

How do the following people handle or deal
with scandal?
Some may exploit it while
others may down-play it. How is this done?
Scandal
Heterosexual
Promiscuity

Graft
(Abscam)

Homosexuality

Actors
Candidates
Party:
A) Districts
B)

Congress
as a whole

Media
Misuse
of
Funds
Actors
Candidates
Party:
A) Districts
B) Congress
as a whole
Media

Drugs

Other
(Specify)
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Opponents
6.

In the past ten years has there been greater
media attention to scandals? Why?

Thank You!
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Item #3:

Mailing- List

I wrote letters and sent questionnaires to
the following people.
(The "X" after the name
indicates that either they responded personally or
someone in their office responded.)
National Congressional Election Committee :
X

Atwood, Brian .
paign Committee

Democratic Senatorial Cam-

Daniels, Mitch.
torial Committee

National Republican

Sena-

X

David,
Marta.
Democratic
Campaign Committee

Congressional

X

Franks, Martin.
Democratic
Campaign Committee

Congressional

X

Vander Jagt, Guy.
National
Congressional Committee

Republican

State Party Leaders:
Aker low, Charles.
Atkins,
Party

Chester.

x
x

Colley, Michael.

X

Shea, Patrick.

Massachusetts Democratic
Ohio Republican Party

Natfios, Andrew.
Party

Tipps, Paul.

Utah Republican Party

Massachusetts Republican

Utah Democratic Party
Ohio Democratic Party
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Pollsters:
Hamilton, William
Hart, Peter
X

Jones, Dan
Lawrence, Gary
Tarrence, Lance

X

Teeter, Robert

Media:
X

Ciccone, Richard.
Times

Political Editor, Chicago

Broder, David.
Post

Political Editor, Washington

x

Eisman , Dale.
Times-Dispatch

Political

x

Endicott,
William.
Angeles Times
Nourse, Dick.

X

Editor,

Political

Richmond

Editor,

Los

Anchorman, KSL News

Parker, Douglas.
City Tribune

Political Editor, Salt Lake

Webb,
News

Political

Lavarr.

Editor,

Deseret

Opponents:
X

Appelgate, Douglas.
Dowdy, Wayne.

Ohio (Representative)

Mississippi (Representative)
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Dyson, Roy.

Maryland (Representative)

Foglietto, Thomas (Representative)
X

Mariott, Dan.

Utah (Representative)

Quayle , Dan.

Indiana (Senator)
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ENDNOTES
1

The cover letter and questionnaire can be
found in the Appendix.
2

For
a
list
of those
to
whom
the
questionnaire was mailed, see Appendix, Item #3 .

.,

"Interview with Patrick Shea, 27 February
1984.
4

Interview
27 February 1984.
5

Ibid.

with

Richard

Ciccone,
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